Reasoning with exceptions: an event-related brain potentials study (online) by Pijnacker, J. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/76968
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
Reasoning with Exceptions: An Event-related Brain
Potentials Study
Judith Pijnacker1, Bart Geurts1, Michiel van Lambalgen2,
Jan Buitelaar1,3,4, and Peter Hagoort1,5
Abstract
■ Defeasible inferences are inferences that can be revised in the
light of new information. Although defeasible inferences are per-
vasive in everyday communication, little is known about how and
when they are processed by the brain. This study examined the
electrophysiological signature of defeasible reasoning using a
modified version of the suppression task. Participants were pre-
sented with conditional inferences (of the type “if p, then q; p,
therefore q”) that were preceded by a congruent or a disabling
context. The disabling context contained a possible exception
or precondition that prevented people from drawing the conclu-
sion. Acceptability of the conclusion was indeed lower in the dis-
abling condition compared to the congruent condition. Further,
we found a large sustained negativity at the conclusion of the dis-
abling condition relative to the congruent condition, which started
around 250msec andwas persistent throughout the entire epoch.
Possible accounts for the observed effect are discussed. ■
INTRODUCTION
In everyday communication, the meaning of an utterance
usually goes beyond its explicit linguistic meaning. For ex-
ample, take the following situation. I have invitedmy friend
for dinner at 7 oʼclock. At 6:45 my telephone rings. It is my
friend and he says “I have a flat tire.” To understand his
utterance, there is a lot more required than just combin-
ing word meanings and syntactic structure. Background
knowledge and inferences are involved too. As I know that
my friend does not have a car, I will infer that it is my
friendʼs bike that has a flat tire. Moreover, I might infer that
if he has a flat tire, he will arrive later. Further, I reason that
if he is late, it will be better to turn off the oven, otherwise
the meal might burn.
Although such inferences are pervasive in everyday com-
munication, little is known about how and when they are
processed by the brain. This study examines the electro-
physiological signature of everyday inferences. The fo-
cus is on one particular form of inference, namely,
conditional inferences, which always have “If p then q”
as one of their premises. One classical inference asso-
ciated with conditionals is modus ponens, in which the
second premise (1b) confirms the antecedent of the con-
ditional premise (1a):
(1a) If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
(1b) Mary has an exam.
(1c) Mary will study in the library.
Most people accept this inference (for a review, see
Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). According to classical
logic, modus ponens is considered valid, which means
that the conclusion necessarily follows from the pre-
mises. This makes classical logic monotonic: Additional
information cannot render an inference invalid if it was
valid previously. However, many studies (e.g., Pijnacker
et al., 2009; Bonnefon&Hilton, 2002; Politzer & Bourmaud,
2002; Dieussaert, Schaeken, Schroyens, & dʼYdewalle,
2000; Byrne, Espino, & Santamaria, 1999; Chan & Chua,
1994; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist, 1991; Byrne,
1989) have found that modus ponens inferences can be
suppressed in the light of extra information:
(2a) If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
(2b) If the library is open, Mary will study in the library.
(2c) Mary has an exam.
(2d) Mary will study in the library.
Byrne et al. (1999) presented this reasoning problem
with and without premise (2b). As soon as the extra pre-
mise (2b) came in, the number of people concluding that
Mary will study in the library dropped to about 50%,
whereas without the extra premise most people accepted
the conclusion. Thus, the addition of an extra premise
such as (2b) leads to a significant decrease of the rate
at which a modus ponens inference is accepted. This has
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been called the suppression effect (Byrne et al., 1999;
Byrne, 1989, 1991). Example (2) clearly illustrates that
conditional reasoning is not monotonic, but defeasible:
New information can cause people to retract an inference.
Everyday inferences are usually defeasible, too. In the
above-mentioned example, I reasoned that if my friend
has a flat tire, he will arrive later, but I will withdraw this
inference if he tells me that he took a bus.
Although there is an extensive literature on the sup-
pression effect, it is still unclear how defeasible inferences
are processed in the brain. ERPs have been proven to be a
useful tool for investigating the time course of information
processing because they have a good temporal resolution
and can provide on-line information about cognitive pro-
cesses. As far as we know, there is just one study that ex-
amined conditional reasoning using ERPs: Qiu et al. (2007)
found that conditional inferences elicited a larger negativity
than a baseline task between 500 and 700 msec, and be-
tween 1700 and 2000 msec after onset of the second prem-
ise. However, it is not clear how much significance we
should attach to these findings, as the premises were pre-
sented in their entirety, and therefore, this study does not
give us a precise idea of the time course of conditional
reasoning.
Perhaps more informative are the studies that have used
ERPs for investigating the processing of linguistic informa-
tion, as integration of linguistic information is an essential
part of reasoning. One ERP component that is related to
linguistic processing is the N400 effect, which is a negative
shift that has a peak around 400 msec after the critical
word, and has a centro-parietal scalp distribution. The
N400 effect was first found for sentences ending with a se-
mantically inappropriate word, like “He spread his warm
bread with socks”1 in contrast to “He spread his warm
bread with butter” (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). Later, it was
found that the N400 effect also occurs in sentences that
are semantically appropriate but where words conflict with
(i) expectancy, such as pocket in “Jenny put the sweet in
her mouth/pocket after the lesson” (Hagoort & Brown,
1994); (ii) world knowledge, such as white in “Dutch
trains are yellow/white and very crowded”2 (Hagoort, Hald,
Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004); and (iii) discourse con-
text, such as slow in “As agreed upon, Jane was to wake
her sister and her brother at five oʼclock in the morning.
But the sister had already washed herself, and the brother
had even got dressed. Jane told the brother that he was ex-
ceptionally quick/slow” (Van Berkum, Zwitserlood, Hagoort,
& Brown, 2003; Van Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999).
Furthermore, St. George, Mannes, and Hoffman (1997)
showed that implicit information, such as bridging infer-
ences, affects the N400 amplitude as well. In general, the
N400 effect is seen as an index of processes involved in the
integration of themeaning of a word into a representation of
its preceding context. As integration of a word into the con-
text becomes harder because it does not satisfy semantic
expectations, the amplitude of the N400 increases (Van
Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999; Brown &Hagoort, 1993).
Another negative ERP component that has been found
in linguistic tasks is the sustained negativity. This negative
shift occurs in a similar latency window as the N400 effect,
but is more sustained, does not have a clear peak, and
usually has a more anterior topography. Sustained neg-
ativities have been found in a wide variety of linguistic
phenomena, although it is less clear how this ERP com-
ponent should be interpreted. For example, Van Berkum,
Brown, et al. (1999, 2003) found a sustained anterior nega-
tivity when a nounʼs referent is temporarily ambiguous,
such as girl in “David had told the two girls to clean up their
room before lunchtime. But one of girls had stayed in bed
all morning, and the other had been on the phone all the
time. David told the girl that …,” in contrast to a referen-
tially unambiguous noun. Van Berkum, Brown, et al. (1999,
2003) suggested that the negative shift is due to an extra
load on working memory, because two possible candidates
for a referent must be maintained. Also, object-relative sen-
tences such as “The reporter who the senator attacked ad-
mitted the error” elicited a sustained negativity compared
to subject-relative sentences such as “The reporter who
attacked the senator admitted the error” (Müller, King, &
Kutas, 1997; King & Kutas, 1995), which may be due to
greater working memory load, or perhaps to additional
processing, because in object-relative sentences, the head
noun phrase (“the reporter”) has two different grammatical
roles. Münte, Schiltz, and Kutas (1998) found a sustained
anterior negativity for sentences that present events out
of chronological order, such as “Before the psychologist
submitted the article, the journal changed its policy” rela-
tive to “After the psychologist submitted the article, the
journal changed its policy.” They attributed this effect to
additional discourse-level computation. Furthermore, Ye
and Zhou (2008) demonstrated that participants with high
cognitive control showed a sustained anterior negativity
for implausible active sentences such as “The thief kept
the policeman in the police station” versus its plausible
counterpart “The policeman kept the thief in the police sta-
tion.” They suggested that the sustained negativity may re-
flect inhibitory processes to suppress a representation that
is in conflict with world knowledge. Finally, Baggio, van
Lambalgen, and Hagoort (2008) found a sustained anterior
negativity in defeasible inferences. Participants read sen-
tences such as “The girl was writing a letter when her friend
spilled coffee on the paper/tablecloth.” In the case of spill-
ing on the tablecloth, it can be inferred that the girl wrote
a letter, whereas in the case of spilling on the paper, the
inference that the girl wrote a letter is suppressed, indi-
cating that the inference is defeasible.
Taken together, although these linguistic phenomena
are quite heterogeneous, what they appear to have in com-
mon is that there are two possible representations compet-
ing with each other. There are two possible referents for
the ambiguous noun in Van Berkum, Brown, et al. (1999,
2003); in object-relative sentences, the head noun phrase
has both a subject and object role; in the study of Münte
et al. (1998), there may have been a default representation
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of events in chronological order as well as the actual, non-
chronological order of events; and finally, in Baggio et al.
(2008), there is a default representation that “writing a let-
ter” has a completed letter as goal state, whereas the “spill-
ing coffee event” requires one to revise this implication. In
sum, the sustained negativity may reflect recomputation or
additional processing in order to come up with a meaning-
ful representation, or extra working memory load due to
multiple representations.
The Present Study
This study was designed to investigate the electrophysiolog-
ical signature of defeasible reasoning by using a modified
version of the suppression task (Byrne, 1989). Partici-
pants read modus ponens inferences preceded either by
a congruent context or a disabling context (see Table 1 in
Materials: ERP Experiment section). The disabling context
contained a possible exception with regard to the condi-
tional, and was introduced to elicit suppression of modus
ponens.
We argue that there is a default representation that en-
tails the modus ponens inference. However, this represen-
tation becomes problematic when the inference is
preceded by a disabling context, which causes people to
consider revising the inference. This is in linewith the frame-
work by Stenning and van Lambalgen (2005, 2008), who ar-
gued that conditionals may contain a marker for exceptions
[for instance, (2a) could be interpreted as If Mary has an
exam and nothing abnormal is the case, then she will study
in the library]. In the congruent context, people can apply
so-called closed-world reasoning to exceptions, that is, ex-
ceptions are considered to be not the case, as long as there
is no evidence for any exceptions (i.e., the default repre-
sentation). However, in the disabling context, the original
closed-world assumption cannot be maintained anymore
because a possible exception has now become salient,
namely, that the library may be closed. This prevents people
fromdrawing the conclusion thatMarywill study in the library
(2d). Hence, modus ponens is suppressed (for a detailed de-
scription of this framework, see Stenning and van Lambalgen,
2005, 2008).
For the present experiment, we hypothesized that there
are two possibilities. First, the disabling condition could elicit
a discourse-induced semantic N400 effect at the conclusion
relative to the congruent condition, due to a difficulty with
integrating the conclusion into the preceding discourse as
expectations are not fulfilled. Second, thedisabling condition
could elicit a sustained anterior negativity at the conclusion
associated with two competing representations: the default
representation and the revised one incorporating the pos-
sible exception.
The aim of this study is to investigate how and when the
brain integrates information about exceptions that are rele-
vant to arrive at a conclusion. Although we think it is most
likely that the ERP effect will occur at the final word of the
conclusion, because it is only at this position that it be-
comes clear that the conclusion clashes with the preceding
information, we will also take the final word of the first and
second premise into consideration. To check whether the
ERP effect has the signature of a standard N400 effect, we
added two control conditions that consisted of sentences
that ended with a word that was either semantically con-
gruent or incongruent. Moreover, a Reading Span Test
was included as an index of verbal workingmemory perfor-
mance to investigate its role in suppression.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty right-handed participants took part in the study. All
participants were native speakers of Dutch, had no lan-
guage disorders, had no known neurological history, and
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants
were recruited from the Donders Institute subject pool.
Two participants were excluded from analysis due to an ex-
cessive number of artifacts in the EEG signal. The remain-
ing 18 participants (9 men) were aged between 19 and
32 years, and their mean age was 23 years. All participants
signed informed consent and received reimbursement or
Table 1. Experimental Conditions
Condition Sentence Type Example
MP-disabling Disabling context Lisa probably lost a contact lens.
Premise 1 If Lisa is going to play hockey, then she will wear contact lenses.
Premise 2 Lisa is going to play hockey.
Conclusion Lisa will wear contact lenses.
MP-congruent Congruent context Lisa has recently bought contact lenses.
Premise 1 If Lisa is going to play hockey, then she will wear contact lenses.
Premise 2 Lisa is going to play hockey.
Conclusion Lisa will wear contact lenses.
MP = modus ponens.
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course credits for participation. The study was approved by
the local ethics committee.
Reading Span Test
We used a computerized Dutch version of the Reading
Span Test to measure verbal working memory (for a de-
tailed description, see Van den Noort, Bosch, Haverkort,
& Hugdahl, 2008; Van den Noort, Bosch, & Hugdahl,
2006). Participants had to read aloud 100 sentences, which
appeared on a computer screen. Sentences were pre-
sented in different set sizes of 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 sentences in
random order. When participants had finished a sentence,
they pressed the space bar for the next sentence to appear.
If participants could not finish the sentence within 6.5 sec,
then the next sentence showed up automatically. After
completion of a set of sentences, the word “recall”
occurred on the screen. At that point, participants had to
recall the final word of each sentence in the set (in free or-
der). Participants were instructed to read the sentences
aloud at normal speed, and to remember the final word
of each sentence. Reading span was determined as the total
number of correctly recalled words.
Materials: ERP Experiment
We created 80 reasoning problems in Dutch. All reasoning
problems had the inference form of modus ponens (if p
then q; p, therefore q), and were preceded by a congruent
context or a disabling context (Table 1).
The disabling context contained a possible exception or
precondition with regard to the conditional. Congruent
contexts and disabling contexts were kept as similar as pos-
sible with regard to syntactic structure and sentence
length. There were no significant differences in sentence
length between the congruent and disabling contexts
( p > .1). Final words of the sentences were never longer
than 12 letters to avoid eye movements and average final
word length was 6.7 letters.
In addition to the 80 experimental reasoning problems,
80 filler reasoning problems were used, which included 40
modus ponens inferences with an incongruent conclusion,
20 affirmation of the consequent inferences with a congru-
ent conclusion, and 20 with an incongruent conclusion
(see Table 2 for examples). All fillers were preceded by a
congruent context. Fillers were included to reduce the pre-
dictability of the materials and to balance for response
types (i.e., to evoke “maybe” and “no” responses). In total,
each participant read 160 reasoning problems: 40 reason-
ing problems in a disabling context, 40 reasoning problems
in a congruent context, and 80 fillers.
The twoversionsof the reasoningproblemswere counter-
balanced across two lists. Thus, no participant saw the same
reasoning problemmore than once. Each list was presented
to an equal number of participants. Moreover, four versions
were created in which the order of the items was reversed
according to a Latin square design. Thus, no reasoning prob-
lem always occurred at the same position in the experiment.
Finally, reasoning problems were presented in pseudo-
random order with the constraint that the same condition
never occurred more than twice in a row.
In addition, we included two control conditions in which
semantic congruency was manipulated in order to elicit
a standard N400 effect. These additional two conditions
contained 80 Dutch sentences that ended with a word that
was either semantically congruent (40 items) or incongru-
ent (40 items), such as “Finally the climbers reached the
top of the mountain/tulip.” Materials were taken from a
Table 2. Fillers
Fillers Sentence Type Example
MP-incongruent Congruent context Mark lives on a farm far away from the town.
Premise 1 If Mark is going to the town, then he will go by scooter.
Premise 2 Mark is going to the town.
Incongruent conclusion Mark will go by bike.
AC-congruent Congruent context Golf is becoming a popular sport
Premise 1 If Luc is going to play golf, then he will wear a hat.
Premise 2 Luc will wear a hat.
Congruent conclusion Luc is going to play golf.
AC-incongruent Congruent context Miriam likes water sports.
Premise 1 If Miriam is going to the lake, then she will go rowing.
Premise 2 Miriam will go rowing.
Incongruent conclusion Miriam is going to the forest.
MP = modus ponens; AC = affirmation of the consequent.
474 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 23, Number 2
previous study by Van den Brink, Brown, and Hagoort
(2001). Final words were matched for number of letters
and frequency. Mean cloze probability3 of the sentences
was 94% (range 80–100%). As in the reasoning conditions,
two different stimulus lists were created to counterbalance
congruency so that no participant saw the same item more
than once. Each stimulus list was presented to an equal
number of participants. Moreover, four versions were cre-
ated in which the order of the items was reversed accord-
ing to a Latin square design. Thus, no sentence always
occurred at the same position in the experiment. Finally,
congruent and incongruent sentences were presented
in pseudorandom order with the constraint that the same
condition never occurred more than three times in a row.
Procedure
After participants had completed the Reading Span Test,
the electrodes were placed on the scalp. Participants re-
ceived written instructions in which they were informed
that they had to decide whether a conclusion followed
from short stories. They were instructed to read all sen-
tences carefully and to respond by pressing one of the but-
tons “yes,” “no,” or “maybe” on a button box. Participants
were instructed to sit quietly in a comfortable position and
not to blink during the word-by-word presentation of the
sentences. Stimuli were presented in white font against a
black background using Presentation 10.2 software.
The materials were partly presented in whole sentences
and partly word-by-word when good time-locking was cri-
tical. The trial sequence was as follows (Figure 1). Each trial
started with a 3000-msec fixation cross (+) on the screen.
Then the context sentence was presented for a duration of
2000 msec plus an additional 250 msec times the number
of words. After the context sentence, the first part of the
conditional (“If…, then”) appeared for 2000 msec plus an
additional 250 msec times the number of words. Subse-
quent sentences were presented word-by-word. Each word
was displayed for 300 msec, followed by a blank screen for
another 300 msec, after which the next word appeared.
The conclusion was preceded by three hash marks (###)
to indicate that the conclusion was following. After the final
word of the conclusion, there was a 1000-msec blank
screen before the response options MAYBE–YES–NO ap-
peared on the screen for 4000 msec. A blank screen ap-
peared between sentences. Reasoning problems were
presented in blocks of 10 trials. After each block there
was an optional break. The session started with a practice
block of 10 reasoning problems to familiarize the partici-
pant with the procedure.
After the reasoning problems, the control conditions
were presented in serial visual presentation (300 msec +
300 msec interstimulus interval, and a 3000-msec fixation
cross between sentences). Participants were instructed to
read for comprehension only, and to minimize eye blinks
during the word-by-word presentation. No additional task
demands were imposed. There were five blocks of sen-
tences with optional breaks in between. The whole EEG
session lasted approximately 75 min without breaks.
EEG Recording
The EEG was recorded from 29 electrode sites across the
scalp using an EasyCap with Ag/AgCl electrodes. Record-
ings were referenced to the left mastoid. Three additional
electrodes were placed to monitor eye movements. Verti-
cal EOG was recorded by placing an electrode below the
right eye and Fp1 was used for above the eye. Horizontal
EOG was recorded via a right-to-left canthal montage. All
EEG and EOG channels were amplified with BrainAmp
DC amplifiers, using a band-pass filter from 10 sec to
125 Hz. The EEG and EOG signals were recorded and di-
gitized using Brain Vision Recorder software with a sam-
pling frequency of 500 Hz. Impedances were kept below
10 kΩ for EOG and below 5 kΩ for all other channels.
Data Analysis
Both behavioral responses and ERPs were analyzed. Be-
cause each condition consisted of 40 items, percentages
of accepted items (“yes” responses) per condition were
calculated. A nonparametric Mann–Whitney test (exact,
two-tailed) was used to examine whether responses were
different across contexts.
Prior to analyzing, EEG data were preprocessed using
Brain Vision Analyzer software. EEG data were re-referenced
to the mean of the two mastoids, and corrected for eye
movement artifacts using an algorithmdescribed byGratton,
Coles, andDonchin (1983). Data were filtered off-line with a
30-Hz low-pass filter. Data were segmented from 150 msec
Figure 1. Setup of how stimuli were presented. Times are in milliseconds (msec), w stands for the number of words per sentence, white boxes
represent blank screens. Premise 1b, Premise 2, and the conclusion were presented word-by-word for 300 msec + 300 msec interstimulus interval
(ISI) per word.
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before to 1000 msec after the onset of the critical words (fi-
nal words of Premise 1, Premise 2, and conclusion). Base-
line correction used the 150-msec interval preceding the
onset of the critical word. Trials containing artifacts were re-
jected (11%).
For each participant, average waveforms were com-
puted across all remaining trials per condition. The average
waveforms were analyzed over the 1000-msec latency win-
dow using a cluster-based random permutation procedure,
implemented in the Fieldtrip toolbox (Maris & Oostenveld,
2007), which has the advantage that it controls for Type I
error rates involving multiple comparisons. In this proce-
dure, clusters are identified that differ significantly between
conditions in the temporal and/or spatial domain. Specifi-
cally, t statistics were computed for each data point, and a
clustering algorithm formed clusters of data points based
on significant t tests between conditions in a contrast.
For each cluster, a cluster-level statistic was calculated by
taking the sum of all the individual t statistics within that
cluster. The Type I error rate was controlled by evaluating
the cluster-level statistics under a randomization null distri-
bution of the maximum cluster-level statistic. This rando-
mization null distribution was obtained by randomizing
the data between the two conditions across participants
in 1000 randomizations. For each of these randomizations,
cluster-level statistics were computed and the largest cluster-
level statistic was entered into the null distribution. Finally,
the actually observed cluster-level statistic was compared
against the randomization null distribution. Clusters that
had a p value below .05 were considered significant. The
procedure is more fully described in Maris and Oostenveld
(2007), as well as in the documentation available at www.ru.
nl/fcdonders/fieldtrip.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Reading span scores ranged from 44 to 86 (M = 68, SD =
10.2). On the reasoning problems, participants accepted
significantly fewer inferences in the disabling context than
in the congruent context (U = 28.5, p < .001; Figure 2). A
Pearsonʼs correlation revealed no significant correlation be-
tween reading span and percentage of accepted inferences
( p > .1).
Although we used a delayed response paradigm to pre-
vent artifacts related to responses in the critical ERP latency
window, reaction times in the disabling condition were
still significantly longer in the disabling condition (M =
1325msec, SD=296msec) than in the congruent condition
[M= 1207 msec, SD= 351 msec; t(17) = 3.47, p= .003].
ERP Results
Figure 3A–C displays the grand-average ERPs of the disabling
and congruent condition time-locked to the onset of the last
word of the first premise, the second premise, and the con-
clusion. Visual inspection of the waveforms shows a clear N1
followed by P2, which are characteristic for visual stimuli.
Figure 3C reveals a negative shift at the conclusion of the
disabling condition relative to the congruent condition.
In the statistical comparisons, this negative shift was ex-
pressed by a large, significant negative cluster ( p < .001).
This cluster was present from about 250 to 1000 msec (see
Figure 4A), and was most pronounced at the central re-
gions (Figure 5A). There were no other significant clusters
found for the contrast. Moreover, statistical analysis of the
ERPs time-locked to the final words of the first and second
premise did not reveal any significant clusters ( ps > .1).
We looked for correlations between the negative shift
and the percentage of accepted inferences, as well as be-
tween the negative shift and reading span, in the latency
window from 250 to 1000 msec, using the mean amplitude
difference of central electrodes (FCz, FC1, FC2, Cz, CP1,
and CP2), based on the topographical distribution of the
effect. There was neither a significant correlation between
the negative shift and the percentage of accepted infer-
ences nor a correlation between the negative shift and
reading span ( ps > .1).
Figure 3D displays the grand-average ERPs of the control
conditions containing semantically congruent and incon-
gruent final words. These waveforms also show an N1–P2
complex, and a clear negative shift for the incongruent sen-
tences relative to congruent sentences with a peak around
400 msec. Cluster-based statistics indeed found a signifi-
cant, negative cluster ( p = .001), which was present from
about 260 to 470 msec (see Figure 4B), and was maximal
over the centro-posterior region (Figure 5B). Furthermore,
a late positive cluster was found where the incongruent
condition was more positive than the congruent condition,
emerging after approximately 500–600 msec ( p = .016).
We will further disregard this late positive cluster as the
aim was to elicit a standard N400 effect (for a review on late
positive components in N400 paradigms, see Van Petten &
Luka, 2006). Based on its latency window and topographical
Figure 2. Percentage of accepted inferences (“yes” responses) for the
congruent context and the disabling context. Error bars represent 1 SE
of the means.
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distribution, it is clear that the negative cluster is an instance
of a standard N400 effect.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present work was to investigate the time
course of defeasible reasoning in the brain. For that purpose,
ERPs were recorded while participants read modus po-
nens inferences, which were preceded by a congruent
context or a disabling context that contained a possible ex-
ception that could prevent people from drawing the
conclusion. We indeed found that people accepted con-
siderably fewer inferences in the disabling condition than
in the congruent condition. The ERP findings showed that
the disabling condition elicited a widely distributed
sustained negativity relative to its congruent counterpart.
This negativity started around 250 msec after onset of the
final word of the conclusion and was persistent through-
out the entire epoch. Participants also read an additional
Figure 3. Grand-average ERPs from Fz, Cz, and Pz for the congruent and disabling context time-locked to the final word of Premise 1 (A), Premise 2 (B),
and the conclusion (C). Black line= congruent context; gray line=disabling context. (D) The grand-average ERPs for the control conditions time-locked
to the sentence-final word. Here, black line = congruent sentence; gray line = incongruent sentence. Negative values are plotted upward.
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set of control sentences, in which semantic congruency
was manipulated in order to elicit a standard N400 effect,
whichwas indeed found, followed by a late positive compo-
nent for words that were semantically anomalous with the
prior sentence relative to semantically congruent words.
It is clear that the observed negativity in the reasoning
conditions differs from the standard N400 effect in the con-
trol conditions in terms of its morphology and temporal
profile: A peak is lacking and the effect is much more sus-
tained than a standard N400 effect. This suggests that the
effect evoked by the reasoning conditions is different from
that elicited by semantic anomalies. However, the scalp dis-
tribution of the effects was very similar. Hence, the sus-
tained negativity may reflect the contribution of the same
neural processes as the N400 effect.
Based on other studies that have observed sustained
negativities, the observed negativity in the reasoning
conditions might reflect additional processing because a
Figure 4. Difference waveform of the reasoning conditions (A) time-locked to the final word of the conclusion, and of the control conditions (B)
time-locked to the sentence-final word. Gray blocks represent significant areas. Negative values are plotted upward.
Figure 5. Scalp distribution of
the sustained negativity at the
conclusion in the reasoning
conditions (A), and of the N400
effect in the control conditions
(B). Scalp distributions are based
on mean amplitude differences
in four consecutive time intervals
of 250 msec length. Scale values
are in microvolts (μV).
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default inferencemust be revised to incorporate an excep-
tion. This explanation is supported by Baggio et al. (2008),
who also found a sustained negativity when a default in-
ference had to be overridden and revised, albeit that the
scalp distribution of the observed effect in our study was
more central than in their study. Alternatively, the sus-
tained negativity may reflect an attempt to link the excep-
tion with information retrieved from long-term memory,
or extra working memory demands to hold information
about the exception in mind in order to withdraw the
conclusion (Markovits & Potvin, 2001; Vadeboncoeur &
Markovits, 1999; Rösler, Heil, & Glowalla, 1993). However,
the workingmemory account seems less likely because we
failed to find any relationship between reading span and
suppression, and between reading span and the ERP ef-
fect. Reading span is usually taken as a measure for verbal
working memory capacity (Van den Noort et al., 2008).
Although the current evidence does not support any as-
sociations between verbal working memory capacity and
defeasible reasoning, some caution is required when ex-
cluding the working memory account. Because reading
span is solely based on the storage and active recall of
words, it may not be a good index of the kind of verbal
working memory involved in defeasible reasoning (Waters
& Caplan, 1996).
As mentioned above, it is not clear whether the observed
sustained negativity is different from a standard N400 ef-
fect, because it had a scalp distribution that is similar to that
of a standard N400 effect. The N400 effect is usually asso-
ciated with interpretive problems: As the integration of
the meaning of a word into a representation of its preced-
ing context becomes harder, the amplitude of the N400
increases. If the sustained negativity is indeed an instance
of an N400 effect, then it appears to be associated with
interpretive problems. One could argue that the reason-
ing conditions show a large overlap with “discourse-N400”
conditions, in the sense that a number of sentences have
to be integrated to arrive at a discourse-level representa-
tion. However, several studies have shown that words that
conflict with the wider discourse elicit a standard N400
effect instead of a sustained negativity (Nieuwland &
Van Berkum, 2006; Van Berkum, Zwitserlood, Hagoort, &
Brown, 2003; Salmon & Pratt, 2002; Van Berkum, Hagoort,
et al., 1999). In the light of this evidence, it seems less
likely that the observed sustained effect is due to difficul-
ties with the integration of the conclusion into the pre-
ceding discourse. Moreover, the sustained nature of the
negativity also makes it unlikely that it could be attributed
only to a conflict between the context and the conclusion
while ignoring the premises. In that case, a more discourse-
like N400 would have been expected. Perhaps the ob-
served effect is more sustained because the processes that
are involved in defeasible reasoning are more demanding
than in a “discourse-N400” paradigm. In a recent study,
Baggio, Choma, van Lambalgen, and Hagoort (2010)
found a similar sustained central negativity for coercion
verbs such as to begin in “The journalist began the article
before his coffee break” compared to “The journalist
wrote the article before his coffee break.” The first sen-
tence requires the reader to infer what is actually meant
by began. Thus, coercion verbs involve some semantic en-
richment, which seems to require additional processing.
Baggio et al. (2010) suggest that the sustained central
negativity—or “N400-like shift”—they observed may be as-
sociated with more complex, inference-driven integration
of information into a semantic representation. In a similar
way, the observed sustained negativity in the present study
could also reflect more complex, inference-driven interpre-
tive processes, resulting in a sustained N400-like effect.
In conclusion, up to now, little was known about the
time course of defeasible reasoning in the brain. Our work
demonstrates that just within 250 msec after the onset
of the final word of the conclusion, there was an electro-
physiological brain response observed when the conclu-
sion does not fit with the context, which was persistent
throughout the entire epoch. The observed effect differed
from that of semantic anomaly, at least in its morphology
and temporal profile. However, we cannot conclude that
the effect is qualitatively different from a standard N400 ef-
fect, because both effects had a central scalp distribution.
Importantly, regardless of the exact nature of the observed
sustained negativity, the processing of defeasible inferences
seems to bemore effortful than default inferences. Because
this ERP study on reasoning was done in a largely unex-
plored field, the exact interpretation of the observed effect
remains open. Further research is needed to disentangle
processes related to reasoning from linguistic processes.
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Notes
1. Critical words are in italics.
2. It is a well-known fact that Dutch trains are yellow, therefore
the sentence “Dutch trains are white” is false, although the sen-
tence itself is semantically well-formed.
3. Cloze probability is determined bymeasuring the probability
that a particular word is given on a sentence completion task.
The higher the cloze probability, the more a particular word is
expected.
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